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About the paper 
 
This paper is based on input for an expert meeting on German-Dutch defence 
cooperation which took place in November 2012 in Brussels. The meeting was jointly 
organised by the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ and the 
German Institute for International Security Affairs / SWP and involved civilian and 
military officials from the German and Dutch defence ministries and armed forces plus 
representatives from the European Parliament, the European Defence Agency, NATO 
and think tanks. 
 
The text was also published as a SWP working paper and is available at:  









Multinational defence cooperation and planning in Europe is dominated by cluster-
approaches whereby two or more countries work closely together in capability 
development. To date, neither the EU nor NATO has been able to integrate existing 
clusters into a coherent multilateral defence planning process. This uncoordinated 
approach is likely to persist for the time being as nations will probably maintain their 
full control over defence planning and programming. 
In this context, the crucial question is how bilateral and regional initiatives for defence 
cooperation can be steered in such a way that they contribute effectively to better 
collective European capabilities rather than adding to fragmentation. On a general 
note, three criteria can be identified for the assessment of clusters: first, they should 
contribute as much as possible to the collective security needs of EU and NATO – to the 
degree that these needs are defined; second, they need to build on commonalities of the 
security outlooks of participating partners and, finally, they should build on the acquis 
of defence cooperation that has already been put in place. 
Based on these criteria the prospects and potential for deepening German-Dutch 
defence cooperation can be assessed more systematically. More specifically, the build-
up of expeditionary forces, the comprehensive approach to crisis management and 
maritime security would lend themselves as areas for deeper bilateral cooperation 
between Berlin and The Hague. 
 
The Wider Context 
Recent developments – the United States’ increasing focus towards Asia and the Pacific 
as well as significant defence budget cuts – have substantially enhanced the need for 
closer defence cooperation within Europe. This has now become a necessity in order to 
collectively maintain the capabilities needed for Europe’s security and defence. 
Bilateral defence cooperation between Germany and the Netherlands has the potential 
to become a building block to reinforce Europe’s capacities. For instance, both 
countries have embraced a broad understanding of security challenges and have a 
proven track-record of cooperation at the intersection of civilian and military means. 
European capabilities are not just of a military nature. In crisis management operations 
the comprehensive approach requires military and civilian tools to be deployed in a 
concerted manner. Furthermore, the distinction between external and internal security 
has become blurred. Increasingly, military assets are used in support of civilian 





The Cluster Approach – Risks and Opportunities 
So far, European governments have responded to the double challenge of maintaining 
and modernising capabilities with declining defence budgets by establishing or 
reinforcing clusters of defence cooperation. France and the United Kingdom cooperate 
under the Lancaster House Treaty. The Scandinavian countries have the Nordic 
Defence Cooperation. The BENELUX countries are also deepening their defence 
cooperation. Thus, it is obvious that German-Netherlands defence cooperation is not 
unique. It is a cluster among others. Neither is it new: it builds on successful 
accomplishments in the past. Naturally, these should be taken into account when 
undertaking efforts to deepen bilateral defence cooperation. 
While the cluster approach is regarded as the best practical way forward to increase 
defence cooperation and even integration, it also raises questions. Overall coordination 
between the clusters – either in the multilateral structures of NATO and the European 
Union or in a more informal way – is lacking. In this situation, there is a risk that 
opportunities for improving capabilities at a larger scale or for guaranteeing 
interoperability and standardisation are neglected. Clusters might invest in out-dated 
legacy capacities. They can also run contrary to efforts to reform Europe’s defence 
industrial base by limiting industrial cooperation to a small number of countries.  
 
Roles of the EU and NATO 
The European Union and NATO are key international organisations for improving 
overall European and Alliance capabilities. However, in the EU and NATO 
multinational defence cooperation and planning still resembles a jungle rather than a 
cultivated garden. Neither of these two organisations is systematically involved in the 
activities of the clusters. Most probably, the answer to this challenge will not be 
provided by procedures of the past. Rather, existing tools – like the NATO Defence 
Planning Process – will have to be adapted to new circumstances. A new instrument 
such as the European Defence Agency’s Code of Conduct on Pooling & Sharing seems to 
be useful to assist the member states in multinational cooperation. Clusters can be 
drivers of deeper defence cooperation, embracing all its aspects: aligning defence plans, 
launching projects, combining acquisition and through-life management of the same 
equipment.  
An overall review of the capabilities of EU member states is needed to assess the value 
of different clusters for the European capability development. Such a European 
Defence Review (EDR) which puts the existing national assets into a European 
perspective could be the first step to set up the framework of coordination within EU 
and NATO. In a second step, EU and NATO could significantly help harmonising and 
potentially better integrating the different clusters. An important way to do this would 
be to define ‘collective’ capability needs more clearly and translate it into more binding 
defence planning requirements. Member states, however, shy away from this more 





will continue to play a role in managing projects, in particular in the context of the EU’s 
Pooling & Sharing and NATO’s Smart Defence initiative.  
 
Scope for Deepening German-Netherlands Defence 
Cooperation 
In an ideal world, German-Netherlands defence cooperation would add most value to 
European and transatlantic capability development if it were to be clearly framed by the 
collective needs for Europe’s security, building on the accomplishments of bilateral 
cooperation in the past and reflecting commonalities in the security policy strategies 
and concepts of both countries. In the real world, Europe’s security needs are not 
clearly defined. Neither do they fully overlap with both countries’ security policies. 
However, Germany’s ongoing defence reforms will increase its deployable capacities, 
further closing the gap between theory and practice. 
Even in a world that is not ideal, the aforementioned criteria – European collective 
security needs, past record of bilateral cooperation and overlap of security policies – 
are a useful guide for deepening the bilateral defence cooperation between Berlin and 
The Hague. On this basis three areas can be identified: The construction of 




The first area is the further development of expeditionary forces which are able to 
deploy rapidly to distant theatres, e.g. as an initial entry force to stop atrocities and/or 
prepare the ground for larger-scale stabilisation and reconstruction operations. Rapidly 
deployable, robust forces are at the heart of both the EU Battle Groups and the NATO 
Response Force. Both formations, however, have not been tested operationally due to 
political disagreements on their deployment. Moreover, in 2010 France and the United 
Kingdom have decided to build their own intervention capability – the Combined Joint 
Expeditionary Force – which is planned to be operational by 2016 and could be opened 
to other EU and NATO member states as well. Germany and the Netherlands both have 
air mobile forces, which could contribute to rapid deployment operations. 
Furthermore, the Dutch 11 Air Assault Brigade and the German Division Schnelle 
Kräfte – to be constituted by reorganising existing units – are complementary 
capacities. 
However, deployment of combined German-Netherlands Air Mobile-Air Assault Forces 
might be hampered by political constraints and caveats. In both countries domestic 
political factors play a central role when it comes to decision-making on deploying their 
armed forces. Germany has progressed tremendously since its no-go policy on out-of-
area operations in the early nineties. Nevertheless, there is still political restraint to 






A second area of cooperation is Stabilisation and Reconstruction (S&R) operations. The 
European Union and NATO have engaged in S&R activities on different scales and with 
different intensities. In September 2011, NATO published its new Political Guidance to 
improve NATO’s involvement in stabilisation and reconstruction. At the same time, 
however, military-led S&R has increasingly come under public fire in EU and NATO 
member states. There is currently not much appetite in Western publics to repeat large-
scale state-building interventions, Afghanistan or Iraq-style. As a consequence, both 
organisations are likely to engage in less ambitious S&R-missions in the future 
(‘statebuilding light’). Recent decisions to support Security Sector Reform and training 
in Africa (Sahel, Horn-of-Africa, Libya, Mali) with limited civilian and military 
resources indicate this trend. But be it large-scale or small-scale operations, integrating 
civilian and military aspects is a requirement for both. 
Germany (Vernetzte Sicherheit) and the Netherlands (3D: Defence, Diplomacy, 
Development) have broad experience with the comprehensive approach. There are 
fewer policy restrictions as there is wide political support in both countries for 
contributing to S&R operations with the comprehensive approach. The 1st German-
Netherlands Corps Headquarters in Munster already has specific knowledge and 
experience in planning and commanding operations under the comprehensive 
approach. This acquis could be used for building more structural cooperation, for 
example by establishing combined education and training facilities. A comprehensive 
approach training centre could also be opened to participation by other nations’ 
military and civil personnel. It could thus serve wider needs of the EU and NATO. 
 
Maritime security 
Within the EU and NATO maritime security has become an increasingly important area 
of cooperation. This is true for the operational level (Operation Active Endeavour as 
well as Operations Ocean Shield and Atalanta to fight piracy at the Horn of Africa). It is 
also true for the more strategic level. In the beginning of 2011, NATO published its 
Alliance Maritime Strategy and in November of that same year, the Council adopted the 
EU’s first Horn-of Africa Strategy which also has a strong maritime component. 
Moreover, since 2007, the EU has an Integrated Maritime Policy, which underlines the 
need for cross-sector (civil-military) cooperation. The European Defence Agency has 
set up a Maritime Surveillance information exchange network on such a cross-sector 
and cross-border basis. EDA is well-positioned within the EU to play an important role. 
Germany and the Netherlands are important coastal European states with military and 
civil assets in support of maritime security. In 2003 The Hague unilaterally abandoned 
its maritime patrol capacity. Germany received about half of the Dutch P3 Orion 
aircraft, but the idea of assisting the Netherlands in maritime surveillance tasks was not 
explored. Both countries operate a variety of surface ships and submarines. There 
seems to be scope for deepening maritime cooperation, involving both naval assets as 





dimension as both countries have shipbuilding capacities. Bilateral maritime security 
cooperation would also serve the needs of the EU and NATO. It should be a building 
block for EU- and NATO-wide maritime surveillance activities. 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Based on the analysis on the prospects and potential for deepening German-Dutch 
defence cooperation the following seven recommendations can be made: 
1. Clusters like the German-Netherlands defence cooperation should be fully exploited 
answering the double challenge of maintaining and modernising capabilities with 
declining defence budgets. 
2. Clusters are drivers and instruments for deepening defence cooperation. This 
includes defence planning, launching projects and through-life management of 
cluster capabilities. 
3. The EU and NATO should focus on coordination, monitoring and checking of 
clusters’ plans and projects, in particular in order to ensure consistency between the 
various clusters and to assess if they contribute to improving capacities for Europe’s 
security needs.  
4. Efforts should be undertaken to define collective capability needs more clearly at 
NATO and EU levels. On this basis multilateral defence planning can be further 
developed in which bilateral and regional clusters could fit into. 
5. Germany and the Netherlands should develop a combined air mobile/air assault 
capability in support of Europe’s needs for expeditionary forces. As both countries’ 
forces are complementary creating this combined capability is a win-win situation. 
Establishing a combined air mobile/air assault capability might also help to further 
align defence policies of the two countries. It would serve the EU and NATO who are 
in demand of initial entry capabilities for crisis management operations. 
6. Germany and the Netherlands should expand their already existing cooperation on 
the comprehensive approach through the 1st GER-NL Corps Headquarters. The 
knowledge and experience vested in this HQ should be used for establishing a 
bilateral training centre for the comprehensive approach, which in due course can be 
opened to other nations’ civilian and military personnel in support of the EU and 
NATO. 
7. Germany and the Netherlands should investigate the potential for deepening 
bilateral cooperation in the area of maritime security, including all naval assets 
(maritime patrol aircraft, surface ships, submarines). Such cooperation should be a 
building block for reinforcing multinational maritime surveillance capacities – civil 
and military – in support of the EU and NATO.  
